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Reviewed by Christopher Tomlins
Christopher Columbus Langdell in his lifetime did not lack for an occasional 
champion. Though his unusual approach to teaching at Harvard Law School 
bewildered many of his students at the outset, it was fiercely defended by 
a minority, who “proudly assumed the eponym of…‘Kit’s freshmen’ and 
considered themselves the ‘best men’ in the school” even as they were mocked 
for it by the remainder.1 Though faculty colleagues were antagonized by his 
obstinacy in pursuit of reform at the law school, he had the backing of the 
University’s president, Charles Eliot, who had recruited him to the deanship, 
and he quickly gained a right-hand man in James Barr Ames, whom Langdell 
made American legal education’s first (and for a long time only) professor 
selected according to criteria of academic merit.
Still, detraction has been Langdell’s more usual fate, especially in the world 
of legal education he did so much to create. The leading epithets are known 
far and wide: Holmes’ “greatest living legal theologian”; Grant Gilmore’s 
“an essentially stupid man.”2 Paul Carrington offered a more considered 
disparagement in his 1995 “appreciation” of Langdell on the centennial of 
his retirement as Dean of Harvard Law School. Puckishly entitled, “Hail! 
Langdell!” Carrington’s eulogy was a distinctly backhanded salute. Langdell 
“had devised a novel theory of American law, a new method of instruction, and 
a program of credentialing that made his school a paradigm for American legal 
education.”3 A notable trifecta. But Carrington deprecated the institutional 
innovations (the credentialing) that had created the amply funded ground on 
which he himself stood; nor could he detect a smidgen of intellectual worth 
1. Bruce A. Kimball, The Inception of Modern Professional Education: C.C. Langdell, 1826–
1906, 145–6 (Univ. of North Carolina Press 2009). All subsequent page references to the 
book under review appear in the text in parentheses. Courtesy to the reader and to Professor 
Kimball requires I disclose that he thanks me in his acknowledgements for “encouragement 
and editorial guidance over several years.”
2. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Book Notice Reviewing a Selection of Cases on the Law of 
contracts, with a Summary of the Topics Covered by the Cases. By C.C. Langdell,” 14 Am. 
L. R. 233, 234 (1880); Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 42 (Yale Univ. Press 1977).
3. Paul D. Carrington, Hail! Langdell!, 20 Law & Soc. Inquiry 691 (1995).
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in the novel legal theory. The one leg of the tripod Carrington had time for 
was Langdell’s new “case method” of instruction, but only because wiser men 
than Langdell, perceiving a moral subtext where he saw only the surface gloss 
of “legal science,” had effected a separation of the method from its author’s 
madness, and so freed posterity from “transcendental nonsense” to teach 
the enduring morality “of republican politics and law.”4 Once successfully 
detached from his single defensible achievement, Carrington’s Langdell 
came across as mostly a failure and a fool—an unsuccessful lawyer, awkward 
bookish recluse, mulish and credulous intellectual, dredged from obscurity to 
do the bidding of an ambitious educational entrepreneur (Eliot) by creating a 
philistine’s brand of legal education premised on the elevation of institutional 
status over service and sterile technique over politics.5
Though he denied any intent to patronize, Carrington’s terse biography 
clearly achieved it in substance. Called upon to comment, two legal historians, 
John Henry Schlegel and Laura Kalman, did Langdell the greater courtesy 
of finding him important enough to damn in his own right.6 However, a 
third, William LaPiana, did more. LaPiana invited readers to consider two 
unnerving possibilities: first, that Langdell might actually have been a scholar 
of some sophistication and learning; second, and more important, that the 
conception and method of legal education he had devised, though of course 
narrow by current standards, nevertheless had the cardinal virtue of creating 
a modern legal profession trained precisely to look elsewhere than politics for 
its sense of validity and relevance. “By making the mastery of legal science 
the hallmark of professional competency and prestige, case method education 
gave lawyers a claim to social position and power based less on the defense 
of certain ideas about society and government than on apparently apolitical 
expertise.” From a late 20th century standpoint, LaPiana suggested, a legal 
profession whose measure of success was technical capacity to do what it did 
well might actually be preferable to one trained from this point of a twirling 
compass or that to do good. In Langdell as scholar and teacher, LaPiana espied 
a craftsman’s modesty, wholesomely detached from an architect’s ambition.7
At the time he wrote in rebuttal of Carrington, LaPiana’s own published 
research had already established a firmer basis for—dare-one-say—judicious 
assessment of the origins of modern American legal education and C.C. 
Langdell’s role at its inception than could be found anywhere else in 
4. Id. at 692–94, 708–09, 711–12, 716. “Transcendental nonsense” is Felix Cohen’s term for the 
doctrinaire legal formalism which Langdellian “legal science” is generally taken to embrace. 
See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. 
Rev. 809 (1935).
5. Carrington, supra note 3, at 704–10.
6. John Henry Schlegel, Damn! Langdell!, 20 Law & Soc. Inquiry 765 (1995); Laura Kalman, 
To Hell with Langdell!, 20 Law & Soc. Inquiry 771 (1995).
7. William P. LaPiana, Honor Langdell, 20 Law & Soc. Inquiry 761 (1995).
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contemporary legal-historical scholarship.8 Since the late 1990s, however, the 
baton has been carried by Bruce Kimball. Coming from a background in the 
history of education and of the professions rather than legal history, Kimball’s 
principal interest was in Langdell the educator. But in the course of nearly 
fifteen years of research he has successfully broadened that interest to Langdell 
the lawyer and legal scholar. Kimball’s research has already been widely enough 
disseminated to attract the attention of anyone with an interest in Langdell or 
the history of legal education; over the last ten years he has published some 
dozen articles on both, clustered principally in three journals—the Journal of 
Legal Education,9 the Law and History Review,10 and Law and Social Inquiry.11 From the 
outset, however, Kimball’s intention was always to write a biography that would 
situate Langdell at a specific crossroads—Harvard’s invention of the modern 
American law school, Langdell’s role in that invention, and the relationship 
of that invention to the inception of modern professional education. That 
biography is now before us. How successful has Kimball been?
A successful biography generally demands a subject whose recorded life 
is rich enough to sustain a reader’s curiosity about how this person came to 
think and act in a particular way—or in the absence of record, an author willing 
to imagine enough of the web of relations between a formed self (body and 
intellect) and formative circumstance to fill in the blanks. Kimball’s Langdell 
makes it across this particular threshold—but only just. Langdell is born in 
1826 to a New Hampshire farm household, the third of five children, three boys 
and two girls. It is a hard place, and for a good thirty years, his will be a hard 
life. By the time he is seven, his mother and both brothers are dead, his father 
is in penury, he and two sisters have been dispersed to relatives and beyond. 
8. William P. LaPiana, Logic and Experience: The Origin of Modern American Legal 
Education (Oxford Univ. Press 1994).
9. Bruce A. Kimball, Young Christopher Langdell, 1826–1854: The Formation of an 
Educational Reformer, 52 J. Legal Educ. 189 (2002); Bruce A. Kimball, Students’ Choices 
and Experience During the Transition to Competitive Academic Achievement at Harvard 
Law School, 1876–1882, 55 J. Legal Educ. 163 (2005); Bruce A. Kimball & Brian S. Shull, 
The Ironical Exclusion of Women from Harvard Law School, 1870–1900, 58 J. Legal Educ. 
3 (2008).
10. Bruce A. Kimball, “Warn Students That I Entertain Heretical Opinions, Which They Are 
Not to Take as Law”: The Inception of Case Method Teaching in the Classrooms of the Early 
C. C. Langdell, 1870–1883, 17 Law & Hist. Rev. 57 (1999); Bruce A. Kimball, The Langdell 
Problem: Historicizing the Century of Historiography, 1906–2000s, 22 Law & Hist. Rev. 
277 (2004); Bruce A. Kimball, Langdell on Contracts and Legal Reasoning: Correcting the 
Holmesian Caricature, 25 Law & Hist. Rev. 345 (2007).
11. Bruce A. Kimball & R. Blake Brown, “The Highest Legal Ability in the Nation”: Langdell 
on Wall Street, 1855–1870, 29 Law & Soc. Inquiry 39 (2004); Bruce A. Kimball & R. Blake 
Brown, The Principle, Politics, and Finances of Introducing Academic Merit as the 
Standard of Hiring for “the teaching of law as a career,” 1870–1900, 31 Law & Soc. Inquiry 
617 (2006). See also Bruce A. Kimball & Pedro Reyes, The First Modern Civil Procedure 
Course as Taught by C.C. Langdell, 1870–78, 47 Am. J. Legal Hist. 257 (2005); Bruce A. 
Kimball, The Proliferation of Case Method Teaching in American Law Schools: Mr. 
Langdell’s Emblematic “Abomination,” 1890–1915, 46 Hist. Educ. Q. 192 (2006).
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The younger sister will die in 1847, leaving him an effective family of one elder 
and supportive sister who in 1850 will move far away to Kansas. It is unclear 
whether brother and sister ever meet again. He is a virtual pauper throughout 
his adolescence and early adulthood, attends local schools and then Phillips 
Exeter Academy on scholarship, supports himself— and his father—by millwork 
and teaching. He moves on in his early twenties to Harvard, where after a year 
he can no longer make ends meet, returns to Exeter and obtains a law office 
apprenticeship. On completion of his apprenticeship, he returns once more to 
Harvard to enroll in the law school, again on scholarship, and by 1853 has a law 
degree and a reputation amongst his peers not only for fanatical devotion to 
his studies but also “genius.” He becomes acquainted with the young Charles 
Eliot, then an undergraduate in the College, researches thousands of cases 
on contracts for Theophilus Parsons, and in 1854, leaves for New York, where 
contacts with law school classmates help him establish himself in practice and 
begin to earn a decent living. Kimball describes well the formative privation 
of Langdell’s early life and stresses the thread of education and study that runs 
through it as emotional solace. One can see why. Still, the man who emerges 
from Kimball’s account of his youth remains elusive—not morose nor self-
pitying, but still introverted, perhaps taciturn, certainly lonely.12 Eventually 
he will marry, though quite late in life (1880), to a woman thirty years his 
junior. They enjoy a tender and intimate relationship until he dies. She dies 
a year later. Perhaps one signature of a deep emotional privacy is the virtual 
absence of his marriage from his life story. Or perhaps his biographer was not 
interested in the marriage. Kimball tells us of an extensive correspondence 
between Langdell and his elder sister, but not what they wrote about.
Whatever the absence of record or perspective that leaves one guessing 
about the man, Kimball makes up for it in his careful reconstruction of the 
man’s professional career, first as lawyer, subsequently as law professor and 
Harvard law dean. Kimball’s Langdell is not Carrington’s cartoon. By 1860, 
six years after leaving Harvard, he has become a successful and innovative 
lawyer in New York City with a “flourishing practice” (42), a sterling 
reputation as a shrewd and effective attorney, and a technician’s mastery of 
the era’s increasingly complex litigation, particularly in the realms of wills and 
estates, equity procedure, and commercial law. Work in Langdell’s Wall Street 
office acquaints him with a tendency that will only become more pronounced 
in big city practice—the relatively lessened importance of “grand style” court 
room combat compared with exacting preparation of extended written briefs 
(65–6). Thus, Langdell’s personal trajectory serves as an example of the 
significant shift in litigation from trials based on principles to briefs based on 
cases, and of a split between trial and paper lawyers in the practice of litigation 
that reproduces in the American case something of the explicitly bifurcated 
12. Langdell refers to his loneliness in an 1883 letter to a law school classmate and friend who 
has recently visited him and his wife. “Nothing has happened since [your visit]…that so 
stirred me up. For days after you left, we felt more than the loneliness of Sunday. (You 
know that the idea which a New England boy associated with Sunday was chiefly that of 
loneliness.)” Kimball, supra note 1, at 314.
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English profession.13 He is an honest and ethical man in a corrupt city, high-
minded, but not a prig. In building a legal career, he shows himself capable of 
the occasional dubious decision (55), even the occasional sharp practice (77–
82); nor does he avoid association with those willing to practice sharper (61–
6, 70–1). Still, Langdell’s law is technique not influence; his careerism extols 
merit and application, ability and learning, not connection and clout. In his 
view, “scientific expertise, academic merit, professional success, and equal 
opportunity” should coincide. When confronted by evidence they do not, as 
proves to be the case in Tweed’s New York, he is outraged. In May, 1868, one 
former classmate tells another that he has encountered Langdell “breathing 
out slaughter against the New York judicial system and judiciary” (69). The 
Augean Stables of the Tweed Ring and of Tammany Hall, and in particular 
the wholesale connivance of the bar on exhibition in the Erie Wars of the 
late 1860s, cool his enthusiasm for practice. Disenchantment coincides with 
an invitation from young Eliot, newly risen to Harvard’s presidency (October, 
1869), to return to Cambridge, become the law school’s first dean, and join 
Eliot’s efforts to flip the University “like a flapjack” (86)—a more manageable 
task, Langdell may have thought, than flipping New York. In January, 1870, 
Langdell accepts an appointment as Dane Professor of Law, succeeding 
Parsons. In February, he returns to Cambridge. Upon installation as dean 
the following September, he immediately sets about the innovations that will 
implement his ideal. They will mean a revolution in American professional 
education.
The chapters that follow, on Langdell’s Harvard Law revolution, are the 
heart of this book and the most rewarding. Until we get to them, it’s fair to say, 
Kimball’s research is assiduous but his exposition no more than serviceable. His 
reconstruction of Langdell’s accomplished Wall Street career is extraordinarily 
repetitive. We first meet Langdell “breathing out slaughter,” for example, on 
page 69, then again on 71, again on 73 and again— after a short break—on 82 
(and again, after a long break, lest we forget, on 271). It is a quirky phrase, and 
it serves to underline a point that Kimball makes over and over—that a century 
before the neologism was coined, Langdell was a devout meritocrat who 
“scorn[ed] to win, or to struggle for, any success which was not the legitimate 
reward of merit.”14 The observation is important—a key to the man, to our 
understanding of the philosophy of professional education he would set in 
motion, and also to what Kimball terms his tragedy (1). Whether Langdell 
was, indeed, a tragic figure we can determine in due course. For the present, 
perhaps it’s worth pausing a moment to sympathize with his biographer: the 
very recurrence of observations like the “breathing” fragment might suggest 
artless writing, or it might indicate how seldom pithy moments of commentary 
or insight turned up in the materials Kimball was able to amass. Tragic or 
not, Langdell is a strangely shadowed presence in this book. “[C]haracteristic 
insularity” (201) is not an easy nut for a biographer to crack.
13. This observation owes much to correspondence with John Henry Schlegel.
14. Id. at 69. James Coolidge Carter to Charles Eliot (Dec. 20, 1869).
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Though repetition—of observations, points of argument, phrases, 
anecdotes—remains a mark of his book throughout, Kimball’s exposition 
nevertheless improves as he turns to Langdell as scholar, teacher and dean, 
to the state of Harvard Law as his (and Eliot’s) great experiment unfolds, 
and to the detail of the innovations Langdell unleashed there. In his twenty-
five years as dean, Langdell: elevated the standard of faculty scholarship; 
introduced enduring changes in classroom pedagogy; fought for the 
recruitment of academically qualified faculty and the creation of an academic 
career track; established meritocratic structures and policies in academic 
administration and curriculum; and reversed the prevailing “commercial” 
logic of professional education—maintain low standards and low tuition to 
attract sufficient students and revenue to turn a profit—by instituting a high 
standard, high cost regime that represented a liberal professional education as 
an inherently valuable credential that also would prove economically valuable 
to prospective employers.
Langdell’s innovations are already well known in outline. Kimball’s 
achievement in analyzing them is two-fold. First, he underscores the animating 
philosophy that rendered each element part of a larger system—the “new set 
of legitimating relationships among a profession, its domain within society, 
the expertise of the professionals, and their education” (2). He leaves us 
in no doubt that this was Langdell’s own personal philosophy. “Langdell 
maintained that the just working of the legal system relies on the effectiveness 
of the legal profession, which depends on lawyers’ expertise derived, in turn, 
from their academic achievement in law school. Academic merit determines 
the effectiveness and the integrity of the members of ‘a learned and liberal 
profession of the highest grade,’ who will then ‘render to the public the 
highest and best service in the administration of justice.’” Education must 
teach expertise, for only expertise could result in practice of the highest 
standard; but education also must inculcate the single standard of merit, for 
only meritorious reward was virtuous and only virtuous practice could ensure 
professional legitimacy (2, also 342–3). Though clearly Langdell and Eliot 
were in close accord in their conception of professional education, Langdell 
was no hired cipher of Harvard’s president. Rather, ideas developed in the 
light of his own education and life experience that Langdell first put in place 
in the domain of legal education became a model for professional education at 
large. Hence Kimball’s title, tying Langdell’s name not just to the inception of 
modern legal education but also to modern professional education in general. 
Kimball’s Langdell is the driving force, and on a wide front.
Second, Kimball systematically creates a thorough, detailed narrative of 
Langdell’s activities in each of his five realms of innovation. Cumulatively, the 
result is a Langdell ably rescued from posterity’s condescension. As scholar, 
Langdell invented and refined the case book, made substantive contributions, 
successively, to contracts jurisprudence and equity jurisdiction, and—late 
in life—entered debate on contemporary issues in constitutional law and 
antitrust policy. Throughout, he employed a far more complex form of legal 
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reasoning—“a comprehensive yet contradictory integration of induction from 
authority, deduction from principle, and analysis of justice and policy” (6, 
124–29)—than the rude “formalist” label is capable of conveying. A highlight 
of Kimball’s discussion of Langdell’s scholarship is his careful tracking of the 
cotillion it danced in response and reaction to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., an 
interlocution from which Langdell emerges—at least during his lifetime—far 
more the innovator than Holmes, whom we encounter, in turn, as admiring 
and dismissive depending on the state of his own ambitions, consistent only 
in his predilection to a certain peevishness. As teacher, Langdell, of course, 
created the case method of instruction, the roots of which Kimball traces to 
Langdell’s youthful interest in education, to his own activities as a law student, 
and to his experience as practitioner. Kimball’s own skills as a researcher 
are shown to particular effect here in his resourceful and imaginative use of 
students’ annotated casebooks to reconstruct Langdell in Socratic classroom 
action. This chapter draws on one of Kimball’s finest and earliest articles on 
Langdell, published in the Law and History Review; a separate chapter adds new 
detail and depth to our knowledge of student life and instruction at Harvard 
Law in the early years of Langdell’s deanship by drawing on Kimball’s 
reconstruction of the paths of four representative students through the school 
and its classrooms, first published in the Journal of Legal Education.15
As law school dean, meanwhile, we encounter Langdell determinedly and 
tenaciously pressing for the application of academic merit to the hiring of 
faculty, the design of the curriculum, and the admission, examination and 
advancement of students, and attempting to institutionalize meritocracy as a 
formal system of academic administration—“rational, impersonal policies and 
rules guiding incremental progress that could be measured objectively” (193)—
to take the place of informal, gentlemanly consensus in governing the school 
and its activities. Interestingly, Kimball observes, Langdell proved to be much 
more an educational than a legal formalist. A practitioner’s experience had 
taught Langdell the limits of the legal formalism to which he was instinctively 
attracted, as the triangular reasoning on display in his legal scholarship attests. 
In educational matters, where his experience was more limited, his formalism 
ran unrestrained.
So completely would Langdell’s model reshape professional education in 
America, that it is salutary to be reminded how long the dean had to feud with 
his colleagues and how uncertain his success actually was. Much of Kimball’s 
account of Langdell’s deanship is a narrative of conflict and deadlock. The 
little club of Brahmin practitioners that was the law school’s faculty remained, 
well into the 1880s, completely unpersuaded of the merits of any of Langdell’s 
innovations. They were discomfited initially by Eliot’s very interference in 
their gentlemanly management of the school. Before his retirement (essentially 
forced by Eliot), Theophilus Parsons had been the most senior professor and, 
as such, acted as “head” of school. Emory Washburn expected to succeed him. 
“In 1870 no one knew exactly what a dean did” (167). Some sort of secretarial 
15. Kimball, supra note 9; Kimball, supra note 10.
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work, perhaps. They were discomfited further by their discovery not only that 
the dean was no secretary, but that the new incumbent, Langdell, was—at least 
by their lights—no gentleman. He was not a boor; in 1881, Holmes (fifteen 
years his junior) pronounced him “a noble old swell” (104, 195). But certainly, 
in his dogged pursuit of change, he did not behave as a gentleman should. 
As Kimball observes, this, of course, was the point of his appointment. Had 
Langdell been “a gentleman,” there would have been no change: the very 
reason he was appointed was to initiate a transformation that no gentleman 
would have willingly countenanced—the transformation of the profession’s 
existing gentry culture by inculcation of an ethos of professionalism. Early on, 
Langdell gained a needed ally in Ames, whose appointment in 1872 to replace 
Nathaniel Holmes (whose resignation Eliot had requested) conformed to 
Langdell’s unorthodox idea of renewing the school by hiring young faculty on 
the (ungentlemanly) basis of academic achievement. Four more appointments 
made in the ten years after Ames, however, were all “from the ranks of the 
active profession” (175)—first James B. Thayer, then John Chipman Gray, then 
Charles S. Bradley (at which point a disgusted Ames offered his resignation), 
then Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Holmes replaced the incompetent Bradley, 
but his own appointment quickly turned into a charade when Holmes’ 
ambition took him, instead, off to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. 
William Keener filled the gap—the first appointment in a decade to conform to 
the Ames model. But Thayer and Gray were horrified and complained bitterly. 
Not until the early 1890s was there any further implementation of meritorious 
academic hiring of young faculty, and then only on a quid pro quo basis 
balancing the appointment of senior established “scholarly” practitioners. 
“[R]ecent graduates like Ames became the norm for new faculty appointees” 
only after 1900 (190).
Langdell was frustrated in the matter of appointments because, for all 
his vocal support, Eliot trimmed, in part for financial reasons, in part in 
response to pressures from the faculty and from the University’s Corporation 
and Board of Overseers. Langdell enjoyed greater success, comparatively, in 
curricular and admissions reform during his first decade, where his objectives 
were an organized, sequenced curriculum spread first over two and then three 
years; written examinations; the admission requirement of a college degree or 
entrance examination; and the addition of an honors track. All were designed 
to create a professional education characterized by academic distinction. 
Eliot’s support in curricular matters was consistent, notwithstanding 
fluctuations in enrollments attending implementation of Langdell’s “very 
restrictive measures,” and all of the desired reforms had been effected by 
the end of the 1870s (221, 222). Even so, conflict was fierce, particularly over 
Langdell’s ungentlemanly insistence that his own courses be given the key role 
in defining academic distinction within the school.
Overall, the transformation of Harvard Law required at least fifteen years in 
curricular matters, more than twenty-five years in appointments policy. Bitter 
struggles—a 19th century Beirut—were its watchword. Yet for all the contention, 
665
Langdell eventually emerged triumphant. Declines in enrollment following 
each major curriculum reform proved temporary, although the decline that 
followed the introduction of the three-year curriculum and entrance restrictions 
was prolonged by the early 1880s recession. By the mid-1880s, the school was 
prospering; by the end of the decade, it was a runaway success, its graduates 
finding ready employers in the big city corporate firms whose genesis Langdell 
had been able to observe twenty years before on Wall Street. By 1895, when 
Langdell retired from the deanship, his model was spreading fast.
Kimball, then, has shown us that C.C. Langdell overcame a deprived 
youth to become a highly regarded law student, a lawyer of consequence, a 
scholar of greater consequence—good enough for his lead to be followed on 
more than one occasion (without attribution) by the revered Holmes—and 
a pioneer of professional education. Though reserved, he was by no means 
friendless; though he had known poverty, he was unfailingly generous; though 
an introvert, he married and enjoyed a loving relationship with his wife. Those 
with whom he disagreed called him arrogant, relentless, and autocratic, but 
these are not unusual terms in academic fights (or those in the outside world); 
and in his relations with his wife and adult friends, he displayed “a ‘tender, 
almost feminine nature’” (13). Throughout his life, he found it very difficult to 
come to terms with the death of those close to him; given his early life, this is 
unsurprising.
Though one might hesitate to call Langdell an extraordinary man, one can 
properly acknowledge a life of no little achievement against the odds. Why 
then call the story of this life “a tragedy both in form and content” (1)? This 
smacks a little of reaching. To be sure, Kimball discovers sadness—poverty and 
loneliness early in life, blindness in later life. Sadness is not tragedy. He also 
discovers hypocrisy. Langdell the meritocrat fails his own meritocratic test. In 
the 1870s he insists “that his own academic specialty of equity should be the 
sine qua non of the honor degree at HLS” (273, also 226). Langdell had reason 
to doubt the rigor of his colleagues’ teaching—all but Ames—but “he still 
violated the most fundamental principle of his own system: that evaluation 
should proceed by disinterested, formal standards of academic merit” (273). 
The violation reappears more ominously in the 1890s, when Langdell makes 
explicit his opposition to the admission to the law school of women and 
graduates of Catholic colleges. Once more, the ideology of meritocracy seems 
exposed as a sham by its advocate’s own “limitations of self-interest, cultural 
background, and inherent subjectivity” (273). Meritocrats, of course, did not 
see it that way themselves: Langdell thought that as a matter of aptitude “the 
law is entirely unfit for the feminine mind—more so than any other subject” 
(289). The basis of his antagonism toward Catholic colleges is not openly 
stated, but he certainly acted on it without any apparent second thought.
In form, a tragic hero is cast down by his flaw or error. We are offered no 
evidence that Langdell’s prejudices had any measurable adverse effect on 
his own life: no shame, no disgrace. He was, says Kimball, sure enough in 
his opinion of the feminine mind to voice it in meetings where gentlemen 
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preferred to dissemble. Nor, without greater willingness than Kimball has 
shown to explore and interpret those aspects of his life that Kimball finds 
Langdell’s prejudices contradicting—“personal relationships with educated 
women” (291), namely, his mother, his sisters, particularly his elder sister 
Hannah, and his wife—could one begin to find the content of Langdell’s life 
tragic. Kimball dances around the edges: he alludes to the higher priority 
Langdell appeared to place, personally, on educating men than women. The 
young son of a deceased law school custodian had, Langdell thought, more 
claim than the boy’s elder sister on a fund set aside to educate the custodian’s 
children. Himself, the orphaned younger son of a poor farm family, Langdell 
feared for the boy’s future—and so he asked Eliot to allow the law school to 
pay for the sister’s education instead of drawing on the fund (291). Kimball 
also alludes, tantalizingly, to the “scholarly manliness” of late 19th century 
professional education, to law school as its most intense expression, and to 
case method as the epitome (Ames thought it “virile” compared to recitation) 
of manly struggle (293). What did this man, “tender, almost feminine” with 
his intimates, gain psychologically from manly struggle with his students, such 
that he could not countenance the presence of women? If his life is to be judged 
tragic, his biographer should make more attempt to answer questions like this. 
Kimball chooses, instead, to assimilate Langdell’s clearly held prejudices to 
the dissimulations of turn-of-the-century meritocratic discourse: “Employing 
the ‘categorical thinking’ of educational formalism, the meritocrats classified 
women and graduates of Catholic colleges apart from the other applicants, 
and then declared the former an exception to the standard of academic merit 
and applied special scrutiny to the latter. Mediated by these policies, the 
invidious discrimination seemed invisible to the meritocrats, who continued 
to believe in their commitment to academic meritocracy, even as the ‘just’ 
system discriminated against these categories of people during the triumphal 
inception of the system that should have, in principle, opened doors to 
admit them” (308). As explanation, this is unexceptionable enough, but it is 
sociology, not tragedy.
In the absence of tragedy, we are left with a biographer’s regret at the 
failings of a subject he has come to admire. Kimball himself believes deeply 
in the possibility of professional meritocracy. The last sentence of his last 
chapter enjoins us to consider that academic meritocracy may “like democracy 
in political life…still be the best of the worst ways of organizing professional 
life” (346). He wishes that, at the inception of modern professional education, 
Langdell’s own commitment had not proven, in certain grave respects, 
insincere.
Kimball’s own eulogy of Langdell, nevertheless, credits both life and works. 
Neither legal theologian nor in essence a stupid man, neither failure nor fool, 
Christopher Columbus Langdell has proven capable of inspiring a biography 
that plainly describes the lawyering of which he was justifiably proud, the 
scholarship that wasted no words on fripperies, and above all the dogged 
creation of a system of professional education characterized by methods and 
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ideas still plainly recognizable 140 years after its inception. Lector, si monumentum 
requiris, circumspice. Paul Carrington described Langdell as a practical man, and 
though that is clearly not all he was, practical is at least part of what he was, 
the part he was willing to let show. A practical man has inspired a largely 
practical biography. No doubt this particular man would have been upset had 
his biographer attempted to see more.
Book Review: The Inception of Modern Professional Education
